Should small businesses be encouraged?

Small businesses are thought to be rather inefficient because of fix and because of other issues that hamper the exploitation of increasing returns to scale in their size range. Yet, policies keep popping up that try to protect them. Why? Is it nostalgia, throwing us back to times were "better?" Or do we want to protect (inefficient) employment? Even this may be moot according to a previous post.

Ben Craig, William Jackson, and James Thomson claim that small businesses should be encourage because they have an inherent disadvantage on credit markets: there are information problems, more acute in downturns, that make access to credit more difficult for small businesses. Thus, it is good for a government agency to provide loan guarantees. Still, this does not address why we would want to have small businesses in the first place. If inefficient firms are getting rationed on credit markets, I am fine with that.

Progesa: a success story thanks to academics

I have written a few times about the frustration when policy makers ignore the advice of economists. Yet, there are a few cases where economists were given free reign over the design of policy interventions, which not only allowed to obtain positive outcomes but also useful information for further study.

Nora Lustig reports about Progresa, the Mexican cash transfers program designed to elicit parents to send their kids to school and make sure necessary health check-ups were attended. From the start, the program was designed and administrated by people with an academic background. Progresa has worked remarkably well, to the point that it was not only not scrapped, as is usual, with presidential changes, its coverage also kept increasing. The only setback was a name change to Oportunidades. The critical ingredient to this success was the scholarly involvement, that not only designed it for success, but also provided the tools to measure this. And along with that a wealth of data that has allowed to understand even better what makes good intervention in practice.

Should we encourage business ownership?

Politicians claim left and right that small business owners are critical to the success of an economy. They woo them with various tax credits and by turning a blind eye to their opportunities to hide income from taxation. Yet, politicians also rewards large companies with generous tax abatements, especially when the relocate or just promise not to move away. So, in the end, who should be encouraged. the small business owner or the big conglomerate? In part, this is a question about whether it is better to have many self-employed workers or many employed workers.

Mirjam van Praag and André van Stel address this question by trying to determine the optimal business ownership from a sample of 19 OECD countries over 26 years. They proceed by estimating a Cobb-Douglas production function augmented with a business ownership rate, its square, tertiary education, as well as interactions of the latter with the formers. This is not a production function that has an interpretation for factor shares, it is rather a test of some relationships in the data. And by the implied non-linearity, it allows to computed from the regression coefficients what the optimal business ownership rate would be. On average, it is 12.5%, which is definitely not high, and it declines over time.

Furthermore, van Praag and van Stel find that countries with a higher proportion of workers with tertiary education enjoy a lower optimal business ownership rate, converging towards 11% when everyone has a university education (no gravediggers?). The interpretation they offer is that better educated people run larger firms. As business owners are a minority in a developed economy anyway and only the top business owners really matter for economic performance, I am not quite convinced by this argument, but it is apparently supported by microeconomic evidence. I would have rather thought that a more educated workforce is more specialized, and under such circumstances it is more difficult to be a business owner. The only exception are start-ups, which then either fails or are gobbled up by a larger firm.

Does it make sense to subsidize biofuels?

Ina relatively short time, biofuels have become remarkably popular, especially as an additive to regular petroleum based fuel. This is at least in part due to massive subsidies from the US to fuel and corn producers. As biofuels compete with food, this has lead to major price increases for corn and sugar, with adverse consequences for importing countries. This begs the question: is it actually a good idea to subsidize biofuels? I mentioned previously that it is preferable to tax other energy products rather than subsidize alternative energies (1, 2), but let us revisit this issue.

Subhayu Bandyopadhyay, Sumon Bhaumik and Howard Wall use a general equilibrium trade model and confirm that if there is a Pigovian tax on conventional fuels, subsidies are not needed. But if the Pigovian tax is not available or too low (as is the case in the US), then a subsidy for biofuels makes sense, But if the country in question is large, there are other implications through increased worldwide demand for food. In that case, a food exporter wants to subsidize biofuels and tax conventional fuels. A food importing country would only want to subsidize biofuels if the pollution reduction effect is large enough.

Hector Nuñez, Hayri Önal, Madhu Khanna, Xiaoguang Chen and Haixiao Huang look more specifically at the interaction of policies in the US and Brazil, the two largest producers of biofuels. Indeed, the US imposes a special tariff on the importation of biofuels, in particular the more advanced sugarcane based one from Brazil. Brazil is also the largest producer and exporter of beef. The paper uses a multi-country, multi-good model, unfortunately with a partial equilibrium, but it takes into account possible crop rotations and different categories of land. It concludes that eliminating the tariffs would significantly reduce biofuel production in the US, with the latter importing biofuels from Brazil and exporting corn. While this reduces producer welfare compared to the status quo, it increases consumer welfare. Given the political system in the US, guess what will happen.

Transfers to mothers may hurt children

It is conventional wisdom in policy circles that if you want a policy intervention to benefit children, transfers have to be paid out explicitly to the mother. The understanding is that mothers care more about their children than men, and thus are more likely to use the funds for them, directly or indirectly. There is really not reason to this backfire, but as two recent papers show, it can, in fact.

Matthias Doepke and Michèle Tertilt build a series of non-cooperative bargaining models of the household and show that things can go wrong with targeted transfers or women empowerment in general. Indeed, for transfers to have an impact on the intra-household allocation of public goods, there needs to be some kind on friction. The specifics of this friction have a large impact. For example, if women are hard-wired to prefer spending on children, then transfers targeted to them may lead to over-spending on children and under-spending on other public goods that also benefit children (say, shelter), reducing child welfare. Or: if the difference between men and women is in the market wage, women will naturally tends to more time intensive activities in the household, such as child rearing. Empowering women leads them to spend less time at home, hurting the children. If empowerment implies that women have access to more private goods (such as bars or entertainment), they will focus less on public goods that also benefit children. While these examples seem a bit convoluted, they highlight that things are not so simple.

Olivier Bargain and Olivier Donni show in another series of models with altruistic parents that targeted transfers may not work as well as targeted price subsidies. They demonstrate that price subsidies have an income effect and a substitution effect, something we teach undergraduates. But they reinterpret the substitution effect as a "targeting effect." Naturally, transfers only lead to an income effect. Thus subsidies are better at improving children welfare, but they are more expensive as they apply to everyone. So it all depends on elasticities, and depending on the situation, transfers or price subsidies could be preferred.

Does hosting Olympic Games matter after all?

Is seems to be common knowledge that attracting big sports events is good for business and especially tourism. I have never found this argument particularly compelling, after all it is mostly local residents who attend such events. And previous research I reported on gives me right: in the case of the Atlanta Olympics, the impact was very short-lived and limited to the tourism industry. But maybe there is more and better evidence.

Markus Brückner and Evi Pappa take a different approach form the traditional impact study: they look at macroeconomic aggregates and focus on the anticipatory effect during the bidding process for the Olympic Games. The fact that a country is bidding gives people an indication that aggregate demand may increase in the future, especially if the country is selected into the last set of candidates. This anticipation can increase economic activity right now. Brückner and Pappa study a panel of 184 countries over 57 years. They find higher GDP growth during the five years before hosting, peaking at four years when the next host is announced. As expected, the impact fades quickly for unsuccessful bidders. And results are robust for World Exhibitions, but strangely reversed for Football World Cups. In all that, I wonder whether bidding for such large events is in fact exogenous. Indeed, you only want to bid if you have a healthy economy, especially if the event is large like the Olympic Games.

Paying farmers for landscaping

Switzerland has had for centuries a rather unique system of communal land tenure for the alpine areas. Indeed, cattle owners send their livestock up from the villages for the Summer season, and these grazing areas are commonly owned and rights to them are inherited. The returns of agriculture in the mountainous areas are, however, far from competitive in this era of globalization, and Switzerland has resorted to compensating farmers for keeping the cows up there. The reason is that cows and some other farming bring landscaping benefits, for example keeping the grass short improves snow management for avalanche prevention and skiing, or preserves biodiversity and prevents invasive plants to take foothold. These direct payments are very close to making farmers civil servants. Note that payments depend on the size of the farm, its location, the treatment of animals and the general ecological friendliness of the business.

A pair of recent papers analyze the new situation for farmers in the Swiss Alps. Chiara Calabrese and Gabriele Mack used an agent-based model to study how incomes of a large number of heterogeneous livestock farmer families would evolve until 2020. Different scenarios are explored (a not described status quo, more subsidy for summered livestock and lump sum subsidy to all alpine farmers proportional to farmed area). Results are not unexpected (no change, more summered livestock and income, less of both). Prices are assumed to grow at a steady rate unknown to reader. Give the recent wide fluctuations for food, that needs to be made more explicit and additional scenarios are needed. Also, this study basically assumes that the government does not face a budget constraint and will always be willing whatever it takes to maintain a policy. At least the costs of the program should be reported.

The other study by Nadja El Benni, Stefan Mann and Bernard Lehmann looks at how these direct payments to farmers influence the distribution of incomes. Due to the terrain, farms are small almost everywhere in the country, and Gini coefficients for farmer income have been rather low compared to other countries. The new policy increased the Gini coefficients even though the payments were implemented in part to redistribute income and they constitute now 79% of a farmers income. The reason is that the disparities in market income have increased tremendously and direct payments are tied to farm size after all.