Policy risk and the business cycle

The US economy seems stuck in its tracks, and many blame uncertainty about future public policy, including me. Indeed, private firms are currently sitting on a lot of cash and are making very good profits, yet they are not investing or hiring. This really looks like a wait-and-see game. But it this justification well-founded or is it just a cheap excuse to justify higher than usual profits in the face of high unemployment?

Benjamin Born and Johannes Pfeifer put some structure into these arguments by taking a standard New Keynesian model and adding uncertainty about monetary and fiscal policy. They measure this by looking at tax rates and monetary policy shocks with time-varying volatility. Previous literature already looked at the impact of aggregate uncertainty, which policy makers can do little about. But policy uncertainty is another matter. And there is hope, as Born and Pfeifer show that the impact of policy uncertainty is not that important (but much larger than uncertainty about productivity shocks) thanks to monetary policy reaction through a Taylor Rule. So that is somewhat reassuring, but then the size of the current policy uncertainty is an order of magnitude larger than when this paper was written, and monetary policy is bound by non-negative nominal interest rates.

The debt ceiling circus is another media debacle

If you compare the media coverage about the current debt ceiling "discussions" in the US to abroad, it is a stark contrast of style. While the US media is focused on the power haggling of politicians, ignoring completely policy matters, foreign media puzzle why such a silly policy the Republicans are proposing is even being discussed. And once more, it makes me wonder why the US media is sleeping.

Roughly, the Republicans want to erase the public deficit from one day to the next, in the middle of difficult times, and without raising taxes, cutting anything to defense expenses and farm subsidies or closing corporate tax loopholes. This is mathematically simply impossible and must results in partial default on public debt, a major increase in interest rates and in then more public expenses to service the debt. In other words, this is an own goal. To top it, the policy uncertainty is severely hurting the US economy which does not seem to be able to get back on track.

The saddest aspect of this is that the media is completely oblivious to this. It is so obsessed to present both views that it shows without critical discussions complete absurdities from the Republicans. I have a hard time understanding the motivations of the right, except hurting the economy ahead of elections or participating in some grand scale insider trading, and nobody in the media is pointing this out. In fact it is relaying the arguments that decreasing taxes will increase revenue, especially if the rich get those breaks. To repeat myself, this is so wrong, especially now. If you want to improve the economy and insist on reducing the deficit, give tax breaks or transfers to the poor and tax the rich significantly more.

The worst is that there are some serious negative externalities on many who have absolutely no say here, and not just the US tax payers, but also foreign economies. Rarely have I seen such a policy kamikaze, say since Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. But at least the US media was then on top things.

Referee home bias

Referees are supposed to be impartial. In academics, this is most of the time helped by the fact that they are anonymous. In sports, referees are public and meeting participants, including spectators, try to influence them. This becomes particularly relevant when the referee has to take a decision against the home team than leaves spectators irate. They could retaliate against him. Does this influence referees?


Andrés Picazo-Tadeo, Francisco Gónzalez-Gómez and Jorge Guardiola Wanden-Berghe look at first division football in Spain, carefully taking into account stadium capacity, how full it is, how far spectators are from the pitch, and referee experience. They find that awarding a free kick does not have a home bias, which is consistent with the fact that this is a split-second decision. The ensuing decision to give the offending player a caution is, however, affected by home bias. This decision is not instantaneous, and social pressure can be exerted on the referee, especially when the stadium is full. The presence of a running track that separates the local supporters form the action does not seem to matter, though. I wonder whether some teams have a larger home bias than others, as the fans' reputation could also influence referees.

Do unemployed and employed compete for the same jobs?

In times like now, it is easy to forget that job seekers are not only the unemployed, but also the currently employed. On-the-job search is rather common but difficult to measure, as it is often not openly conducted. But it is important to understand it for policy, for example to evaluate the impact of job creation programs.

Simonetta Longhi and Mark Taylor just finished a couple of papers that offer some insights about these two types of job seekers in the United Kingdom. In the first one, they compare their characteristics and search behavior and conclude that employed and unemployed job seekers are different. My reading is that the unemployed are often stuck in a sequence of low paying jobs and drift in and out of employment. The employed job seekers are rather on the way up and improve their situation at each change. Thus these two types are not substitutes and do not compete for the same jobs.


In the second paper, they compared the job finding probability of both types. Consistently for search theory, they observe that on-the-job seekers take much longer to find jobs, reflecting that they can afford to wait for the perfect match. The unemployed, however, have content themselves with the first offer, especially since unemployment insurance criteria have tightened in the UK. The presence of the former has no impact on the search success of the latter, confirming that they are not substitutes.

Kuznets in a post-industrial world

The Kuznets curve traces the evolution of inequality as an economy develops. It is based on Kuznets observation that income and wealth inequality increased and then subsided as economies get richer. While this was established on a cross-section of countries, it has been proven right in the time dimension in some cases, like England and Wales through the Industrial Revolution. But what happens thereafter, when an economy further develops into one where the service sector dominates or globalization becomes most relevant?

Jordi Guilera asks this question noting that most developed economies have recently experienced a sharp increase in inequality. Is thus Kuznets' inverted-U becoming a N? Beyond simply observing this, one would also need a theory with predictions about other correlations to make some progress. The theory here is that skill-biased technological change generates increasingly large education premia, and evidence from long-term wage inequality in Portugal seems to corroborate this hypothesis. In particular it shows that inequality between sectors was the leading determinant of inequality until the 1980s, while inequality within sectors has taken over now.

Trade constraints of developing countries

With all the current posturing in the US and Europe, while addressing doubtlessly important problems, it is easy to forget that there are much bigger issues that need to be solved: how to get the poor and especially the poorest economies to a decent standard of living. We have been blessed to be born in the right families and in the right countries, and we should share this luck with those who were no so fortunate. This does not necessarily mean to give to the poor, just giving them a fair chance may be enough.

Jean-Jacques Hallaert, Ricardo Cavazos Cepeda and Gimin Kang consider the consequences of trade barriers on developing economies. The latter should be able to benefit greatly from selling on world markets goods produced with the factor they are relatively rich of, unskilled labor and to some extend land, while importing the complementary goods, likely capital-intensive investment goods. This OECD study finds that developed economies cannot do much more in terms of reducing import tariffs. Where there is more potential is with home-grown issues: unreliability of electricity, high transportation costs, poor education, bad governance, and instability. These results have been obtained by regressing exports, imports or their sum on a number of indicator for a panel of data. I am not particularly keen on these exercises due to poor data quality, gigantic endogeneity and especially the fact that proxies for essentially unquantifiable variables are used, like property rights and governance. But I suppose this is the best one can do, and the results appear to be rather stark. Now as to how to solve these economic problems, that is a gigantic task that we should be really talking about these days, instead of posturing for political gain.

How not to think about class struggles

Depending on the research question being asked, some degree of heterogeneity is required in a model. Sometimes this modeling requires distinguishing between those who provide capital and those who work. This is obviously an abstraction, because in reality these "capitalists" may just be shareholders who also work on the labor market. In fact, they often are, and they save and invest for various purposes, like self-insurance, retirement or bequests. But making households purely capitalists and workers can sometimes prove useful in making a result emerge more clearly, as long as one is conscious of the abstraction. In some circumstances, it is useful to explain why these "classes" emerge, like differences in access to credit or in subjective discount rates. But again, these are abstractions useful for modeling.

Alberto Russo takes this abstraction very seriously. In his model, people are born capitalists or workers, which translates in households either investing in an activity with a multiplicative risk or working for a wage with additive risk. Why that is so and what should be achieved with this is left unexplained. Households face an additional risk: they randomly switch between classes, the probability depending on wealth. The model is "closed" with exogenous and distinct propensities to consume for both classes. The model is then calibrated with parameters values not related to anything observable. The simulations reveal that if one starts with everyone having the same wealth, wealth heterogeneity then emerges. Well, that was unexpected... Even back in 1993, Mark Huggett had a much better model to explain heterogeneity in wealth.